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Would large-scale, free-market reforms improve
educational outcomes forAmerican children?That
question cannot be answered by looking at domes-
tic evidence alone. Though innumerable “school
choice” programs have been implemented around
theUnited States, none has created a truly free and
competitive education marketplace. Existing pro-
grams are too small, too restriction laden, or both.
To understand how genuine market forces affect
school performance, wemust cast a wider net, sur-
veying education systems from all over the globe.
Thepresent paper undertakes such a review, assess-
ing the results of 25 years of international research
comparing market and government provision of
education, and explaining why these international
experiences are relevant to theUnited States.
Inmore than one hundred statistical compar-
isons covering eight different educational out-
comes, the private sector outperforms the public
sector in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Moreover, that margin of superiority is greatest
when the freest and most market-like private
schools are compared to the least open and least
competitive government systems (i.e., those
resembling a typical U.S. public school system).
Given the breadth, consistency, relevance, and
decisiveness of this body of evidence, the impli-
cations for U.S. education policy are profound.
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Introduction
Would families and communities be better
served by a free and competitive education
marketplace than they are by our current sys-
tem of state school monopolies? That ques-
tion lies at the heart of the U.S. school choice
debate, but the evidence presented to address
it has typically been inadequate or even irrele-
vant. School systems that differ from free and
competitive markets in crucial ways have been
used routinely—and erroneously—to make
claims aboutmarkets, while evidence of actual
education markets operating in other nations
has been ignored.
Economist JohnMerrifield recently observed
that “themost intensely studied [school choice]
programs lackmost or all of the key elements of
market systems, including profit, price change,
market entry, and product differentiation—fac-
tors that are normally central to any discussion
of market effects.”1 Despite their shortcomings,
these programs are cited as examples of market
education. “In essence,” Merrifield concluded,
“researchers have drawn conclusions about
apples by studying lemons.”
The present paper draws conclusions
about education-market apples by studying
the apples themselves, reviewing the relevant
research conducted all over the world in the
past 25 years. The paper begins by explaining
the relevance of the international evidence,
and then goes on to describe the methodolo-
gy used to find and categorize studies of pub-
lic school versus private school outcomes. The
results of all these studies are then tabulated
as a benchmark for discussion.
But that broad tabulation is insufficient to
understand the relative performanceofmarket
andmonopoly approaches to schooling.Much
of the education research deals with private
schools that lack crucial market features, and
some of it deals with public schools that face
real competition owing to the presence of large
(if heavily regulated) school choice programs.
So in order to compare genuine education
markets to public school monopolies such as
exist in theUnited States, it is necessary to nar-
rowthecriteria for the studies tobe considered.
Tothat end, a secondtabulationof the research
is presented that specifically compares the per-
formance ofmarket andmonopoly school sys-
tems. The paper concludes by discussing the
pattern that emerges from the international
evidence anddescribing its policy implications.
The Relevance of
the International Evidence
The U.S. education policy debate is paroch-
ial. Evidence fromabroad is seldommentioned
in policy discussions, and when it is, its rele-
vance isusuallydismissed.Thekeyobjection to
the consideration of foreign experiences is that
nations differ substantially in factors related to
educational outcomes (e.g., wealth, culture,
demographics). It is therefore dubious, critics
claim, to assume that the performance of stu-
dents in any particular foreign nation is due to
that nation’s school system alone.
The critics have a point.Whenever a promi-
nent set of international test results is released,
it is common for attention to be lavished on
whichevernationhas scoredhighest in the giv-
en school grade and subject tested. Many in
the media and education policy circles then
call for the emulation of that top-scoring
nation. As skeptics rightly observe, however, it
is not possible to conclude that a particular
nation’s success on a single test is attributable
entirely or even chiefly to its education system
(let alone that its performance is equally high
across grades and subjects).
Fortunately, there are ways of using the
international evidence that not only overcome
the hurdles posed by cultural and economic
differences between countries but actually
turn those differences into an asset. The most
obvious way of eliminating the obfuscating
effect ofdifferencesbetweennations is to com-
pare different sorts of school systems within
nations. A study that compares public andpri-
vate schools within Sweden, or within India,
for example, eliminates international differ-
ences as a factor.
Still, the results of such studies, taken indi-
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vidually, can tell us only that one sector out-
performs the other in that particular nation. But
what ifwe repeat this sortof comparisonscores
of times in a dozen or more very different
countries, and we find the same result occur-
ring over and over again? If a particular
approach to organizing and funding schools
consistently outperforms other approaches
across widely varying circumstances, we can be
fairly confident that theobservedpattern is the
result of the system itself, and not simply an
accident of circumstance—because, although
the circumstances will have varied from place
to place, the results will have remained the
same. In fact, the greater the cultural and eco-
nomic differences among the nations studied,
the more striking any consistent pattern of
results becomes.
The approach to the international data
described above is a form of natural experimen-
tation, amethod used to great effect in fields as
diverse as epidemiology and cosmology.2 By
applying it to the international research on pri-
vate versus government provision of education,
we can discover answers to questions that are
difficult to explore empirically in any otherway.
Methodology
The studies reviewed in this paperwere col-
lected over several years by a combination of
Internet searches (chiefly via Google), multi-
database computer searches of academic jour-
nals, and examination of the sources cited in
previously identified studies. The search
strings usedwere extensive and varied, consist-
ing of combinations of numerous synonyms
for, and varieties of, “private schools,” “public
schools,” and “outcomes.”
Once identified, studies were included in
this review if they used generally accepted
quantitative methods to compare public ver-
sus private school performance in one or
more of these areas:
• Academic achievement (as measured by
student test scores)
• Efficiency (measured as academic achieve-
ment per dollar spent per pupil)
• Parental satisfaction
• Orderliness of classrooms
• Condition in which facilities weremain-
tained
• Subsequent earnings of graduates (of K-
12 academic programs)
• Attainment (graduation rates of high
schools, or highest average grade com-
pleted)
• Effects on measured intelligence
Fifty-five studies, covering more than 20
nations, were found to meet the criteria laid
out above. Some of these studies reported
more than one statistical comparison of pri-
vate and government schools, either because
the research was conducted in several distinct
locations, because several different types of
private schools were examined, or because
multiple distinct outcomesweremeasured. In
these cases, each comparison, or “finding,” is
counted separately in the tabulations of
results that follow. Each row inTable 1, below,
records all of the findings for a given geo-
graphical area and for the type of schools
reported in the specified study.
Academic achievement results for different
grades or subjects are not counted as separate
findings in the tabulations if they are from the
same geographical area and for the same types
of schools. Instead, academic achievement
comparisons for different grades or subjects
are combined into a single overall “academic
achievement” finding for the given geographi-
cal location and school type.3
The results of alternative model specifica-
tions within a single study are not reported as
separate findings. Instead, only themodel pre-
ferred by the study’s authors is reported. This
is to avoid including findings from models
that are deemed misspecified by their own
authors, and also to avoid overweighting stud-
ies that report results for numerous slightly
differentmodel specifications applied to a sin-
gle data set.
One of the most challenging issues for any
literature review is the decision of whether or
not to reject studies from consideration on
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methodological grounds, and if so, what crite-
ria to use. In principle, studies whose models
are biased in the samedirection as their results
should be discounted, because the resultsmay
simply be artifacts of the erroneous model
(e.g., amodel biased in favor of private schools
may show a private sector advantage when
none in fact exists).
Difficulties arise, however, in the assessment
of what constitutes a sufficient degree of mod-
el misspecification to warrant a study’s exclu-
sion. For example, I argued,4 and others empir-
ically demonstrated,5 that the Braun, Jenkins,
and Grigg study of U.S. public and private
schools6 sufferedseveremodelmisspecification,
although other scholars accepted it without
question.7 If broad agreement could not be
reached in a single seemingly straightforward
case such as that, then agreement across 55 dif-
ferent studies is unlikely indeed. For that rea-
son, the present literature review opts not to
exclude any studies due to perceived method-
ological flaws, allowing readers to come to their
own judgments regardingwhich studies, if any,
should be dropped from consideration.
The inclusive approach adopted in the pre-
sent review should not significantly skew its
results so longas there isnomajor sourceofbias
that would disproportionately favor one sector
over theother. Somemight argue, however, that
there is a potential source of asymmetrical bias:
so called “selection bias.” Selection bias occurs
when families choose public or private schools
because of personal characteristics related to
educational outcomes, and researchers fail to
control for those characteristics. Some scholars
contend that parentswho choose to pay for pri-
vate schoolingmust have greater interest in and
expectations for their children’s educational
success, and that this could lead to higher
achievement for their children nomatter which
type of school the children ultimately attend.
But, if these presumably more motivated par-
ents disproportionately choose private schools,
then the private sector will enjoy an academic
advantage that must be controlled for in order
tomake a fair comparison between the sectors.
There are two reasonswhy selection bias is
unlikely to dramatically skew the results of
this literature review: first, many of the stud-
ies reviewed here expressly control for selec-
tion bias; and second, the effect of control-
ling for selection bias is not uniform and in
many cases private school advantages persist
or even grow after the application of such
controls.8 A discussion of how selection bias
was dealt with in many of the studies collect-
ed here, and the effect that controlling for it
had on the results of those studies, can be
found in an earlier literature review.9
Moreover, thedistributionof research find-
ings in this field is so stark that it is difficult to
imagine any plausible source of error that
couldupset the currentlyprevailingpattern, as
will become evident in the next section.
Findings: Private Versus
Government Schooling
Table 1 distills the international research
findings comparing private and government
provision of education across eight different
measures:
Ach Student academic achievement
Eff Efficiency (achievement per dollar
spent per pupil)
Sat Parental satisfaction
Ord Orderliness of classrooms
Fac Physical condition in which facilities
are maintained
Ear Subsequent earnings of graduates
(of K-12 academic programs)
Att Attainment (graduation rates of
high schools, or highest average
grade completed)
Int Effects on measured intelligence
For each of those measures, a value of 1
indicates a statistically significant advantage
for private schools, a value of -1 indicates a
statistically significant advantage for public
schools, and a value of 0 indicates a statisti-
cally insignificant finding. Each finding is
also categorized according to three contextu-
al details:
PrF Parents directly pay, on average, a
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third or more of the cost of the pri-
vate schools under consideration
Aut The private schools under consider-
ation have considerable or complete
managerial autonomy (e.g., over
pedagogy, staffing, etc.)
Mon The government schools under con-
sideration are considered monopo-
lies if they receive at least 30 percent
more government funding per pupil
than do most private schools
Findings for each of the above three
details is coded as 1 if true or 0 if false, and
findings for which these details are unknown
are coded as blank cells in the table.
Each finding is also identified by the geo-
graphical location from which the data were
collected and an abbreviated author/year cita-
tion. For complete citations, see the appendix.
Note that the results inTable1 likelyunder-
state the private sector’s efficiency advantage.
In several cases (e.g., Peterson and Llaudet and
the Dronkers and Roberts studies), private
schools are found tohave comparable or better
academic achievement than government
schools, but these studies do not report effi-
ciency comparisons. Given that spending per
pupil is generallyhigher ingovernment than in
private schools, the achievement findings in
these studies strongly suggest an additional
efficiency advantage for the private sector
which is not reflected in the Table 1 results
(equal or higher achievement at a lower per
pupil cost is the definition of efficiency).10
Figure 1 andTable 2 summarize theTable 1
5
Table 1
Private vs. Government School Outcomes: The International Research Findings
Educational Outcomes School Details Study Details
Ach Eff Sat Ord Fac Ear Att Int PrF Aut Mon Location Author(s) & Date
1 1 1 1 USA Aftab 2006
1 1 1 1 1 Pakistan Alderman, Orazem & Paterno 2001
1 0 0 0 Chile Anand, Mizala, Repetto 2006
1 1 1 1 Colombia Angrist et al. 2002
1 0 0 0 Sweden Ahlin 2004
1 1 0 1 1 Colombia Barrera-Osori 2006
0 -1 1 0 1 IndiaBashir 1997
1 1 0 0 1 IndiaBashir 1997
1 1 Indonesia Bedi & Garg 2000
0 1 1 1 USA Braun, Jenkins & Grigg 2006
1 1 1 0 Chile Contreras 2002
1 0 0 0 Chile Contreras 2002
1 1 1 0 Chile Contreras, Elacqua & Salazar 2006
1 0 0 0 Chile Contreras, Elacqua & Salazar 2006
-1 0 0 0 Chile Contreras, Elacqua & Salazar 2006
1 0 0 0 Chile Cusato & Palafox 2002
1 1 1 1 1 1 India De et al. 1999
1 0 International Dronkers & Robert 2003
-1 1 International Dronkers & Robert 2003
1 0 International Dronkers & Robert 2008
-1 1 International Dronkers & Robert 2008
0 1 1 0 1 Germany Dronkers, Baumert & Schwippert 2002
Continued on next page
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6Table 1—Continued
Educational Outcomes School Details Study Details
Ach Eff Sat Ord Fac Ear Att Int PrF Aut Mon Location Author(s) & Date
1 1 1 1 Vietnam Glewwe & Patrinos 1999
1 1 India Govinda & Varghese 1993
1 0 1 1 Milwaukee Greene 2004
1 0 1 1 USA Greene & Forster 2003
1 0 1 1 Milwaukee Greene et al. 1996
1 1 1 1 USA Grogger & Neal 2000
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 USA Howell & Peterson 2002
0 0 0 0 Chile Hsieh & Urquiola 2003
1 1 1 1 Indonesia James et al. 1996
1 1 0 0 0 Netherlands Levin 2002
1 1 1 1 Colombia Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 1 1 0 1 Dominican Rep. Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 -1 1 0 1 Dominican Rep. Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 1 1 1 1 Philippines Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 1 1 1 1 Tanzania Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 1 1 0 1 1 Thailand Jimenez & Lockheed 1995
1 1 1 1 1 IndiaKingdon 1996
-1 1 0 0 1 IndiaKingdon 1996
1 1 1 1 India Kingdon & Teal 2007
0 0 1 1 New York City Krueger & Zhu 2004
-1 1 1 1 Tanzania Lassibille et al. 1999
1 1 1 1 Tanzania Lassibille et al. 1999
0 1 1 0 Chile McEwan 2002
1 0 0 0 Chile McEwan 2002
0 0 0 0 Chile McEwan 2002
1 -1 1 1 0 ChileMcEwan & Carnoy 2000
1 0 0 0 0 ChileMcEwan & Carnoy 2000
-1 1 0 0 0 ChileMcEwan & Carnoy 2000
1 1 0 1 1 Cleveland Metcalf 1999
0 0 1 1 Cleveland Metcalf 2003
1 1 1 1 Rural India Muralidharan and Kremer 2006
1 1 1 1 USA Neal 1997
-1 1 1 1 Indonesia Newhouse & Beegle 2005
1 1 1 1 USA Peterson & Llaudet 2006
1 1 1 1 1 Colombia Psacharopolous 1987
1 1 1 1 1 Tanzania Psacharopolous 1987
1 0 1 1 Milwaukee Rouse 1998
1 0 0 0 Chile Sapelli & Vial 2001
1 1 1 0 Chile Sapelli & Vial 2001
0 1 0 0 0 ChileSapelli & Vial 2002
1 1 0 0 0 ChileSapelli & Vial 2005
1 1 1 1 Brazil Sprietsma &Waltenberg 2005
1 0 0 0 Chile Tokman 2001
-1 0 0 0 Chile Tokman 2001
1 1 1 1 1 Hyderabad, India Tooley & Dixon 2006
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7Educational Outcomes School Details Study Details
Ach Eff Sat Ord Fac Ear Att Int PrF Aut Mon Location Author(s) & Date
1 1 1 1 1 Ga, Ghana Tooley, Dixon & Amuah 2007
1 1 1 1 1 Lagos, Nigeria Tooley, Dixon & Amuah 2007
1 1 1 1 1 Mahbubnagar, India Tooley, Dixon & Amuah 2007
0 International Vandenberghe & Robin 2003
1 1 1 0 Chile Vegas 2002
1 0 0 0 Chile Vegas 2002
0 0 0 0 Chile Vegas 2002
1 0 1 1 Milwaukee Warren 2008
0 1 0 1 1 Milwaukee Witte 1998
0 1 0 1 1 Washington, DC Wolf et al. 2008
0 Philippines Yamauchi and Abrenica 2002
1 Philippines Yamauchi et al. 2002
0 1 Thailand Yamauchi et al. 2002
Figure 1
Private School vs. Government School Outcomes Number of Significant and
Insignificant Findings, Worldwide
Table 2
Summary of Findings Comparing Private and Government Schooling, by Result and
Outcome Category
Total Ach Eff Sat Ord Fac Ear Att Int
Sig. Private Advantage 85 41 23 7 3 2 4 4 1
Statistically Insignificant 17 14 1 0 0 0 2 0 0
Sig. Gov’t Advantage 11 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
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results, showing the distribution of those
favoring the private sector, those favoring the
public sector, and those that are statistically
insignificant.
Findings: Market vs.
Monopoly Schooling
Althoughtheresultsreportedintheprevious
section have the advantage of comprehensive-
ness, they are not as meaningful as we would
like. The terms “private school” and “govern-
ment school” encompass many different types
of institutions. Private schools in the United
Statesareoftenquiteminimallyregulatedbythe
state andare fundedalmost exclusively through
fees paid by parents. Private schools in the
Netherlands, by contrast, receive virtually all
their funding from the state and must follow
staterules regardingcurriculum,testing, teacher
qualifications, and teachers’ salaries, and they
maynot be operated for profit. These are clearly
different types of institutions. There are also
great dissimilarities among the world’s govern-
ment schools. In the United States, these enjoy
(with only a fewminor and isolated exceptions)
a monopoly on government K-12 education
funding (to the tune of more than $11,000 per
pupil).11 In Chile, the Netherlands, Australia,
partsofCanada,Sweden,andothernations, var-
ious levels of public funding are made available
toprivateaswellasgovernmentschools (though
this funding usually comes with extensive regu-
latory strings), putting the government sector
under somedegree of competitive pressure.
So, in order to understand what the inter-
national evidence has to say about the relative
merits of education markets as compared to
the state-school monopolies that exist in the
United States, we must winnow down the
range of studies under consideration to only
those that contrast market-like private educa-
tion systems with monopolistic government
systems. For thepurposesof thispaper,market
education systems are defined as those that are
funded at least in part by parents paying
tuition fees, do not suffer strict price controls,
and are free of intrusive regulationof their cur-
ricula, methods, and personnel decisions.12
Note that this review is concernedwith the lev-
el of private school regulation actually enforced,
rather thanwith the theoretical regulatorybur-
den expressed in law. That is because many
developing countries have extensive regulatory
codes for private schools but do not enforce
those codes in practice. This distinction, where
it is significant, is usually discussed in the stud-
ies themselves.
Note, too, that this is not the strictest def-
inition of a free education marketplace (e.g.,
it disregards government-created barriers to
entry into the private education sector), but it
serves to identify relatively market-like edu-
cation systems while not overly narrowing
the scope of the empirical findings under
consideration.13
Monopoly state systems are herein defined
as those that do not face substantial competi-
tive pressures from the private sector because
they enjoy at least a 30 percent government
funding advantageper pupil overmost private
schools. The majority of government school
systems enjoy a funding advantage well above
that threshold.
When the findings collected in Table 2 are
winnoweddowntoonly those comparingmar-
ket to monopoly school systems (i.e., those for
which the “PrF,” “Aut,” and “Mon” cells in
Table 1 have the value “1”), the breakdown of
results is as shown in Figure 2 and Table 3.
Discussion
The contrast between Tables 2 and 3 tells a
new and compelling story. While private
schools clearly outperform state-run schools
all over the world across a host of outcome
measures, this difference pales in comparison
to that between relatively free education mar-
kets and statemonopolies.While findings of a
private-schooling advantage outnumber those
of a public-schooling advantage by a ratio of
nearly 8 to 1, findings of a free-market advan-
tage outnumber those of a school–monopoly
advantage by a ratio of more than 17 to 1. And
while there are 17 insignificant public-versus-
8
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private findings, there is only a single insignifi-
cantmarket-versus-monopoly finding.
These findings, moreover, span some of
the most diverse cultural and economic set-
tings on Earth: from the United States to
Colombia, from the urban slums of
Hyderabad to the fishing villages of Ghana.
The parents whose children benefit from
market-like school systems range from some
of the most privileged on the planet to some
of the least literate and most destitute.
Contrary to the expectations ofmany con-
servative and liberal education commenta-
tors in the United States, there is little evi-
dence that government regulation improves
the operation of themarketplace. It is actual-
ly the freest, most market-like education sys-
tems that demonstrate the greatestmargin of
superiority over state schooling.
These findings present an opportunity
and a challenge forU.S. education policymak-
ers. The opportunity is obvious: it is clearly
possible to structure the provision of school-
ing in ways that will greatly improve educa-
tional outcomes. The challenge is to findways
of doing so that will ensure all families have
ready access to themarketplace without com-
promising key features of markets that are
responsible for their superior performance:
professional autonomy for educators, unfet-
tered choice for parents, and some direct pay-
ment of tuition by parents.
The solution to that policy challenge lies in
twin realizations: first, that the goal is not uni-
9
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Market School vs. Monopoly School Outcomes Number of Significant and Insignificant
Findings, Worldwide
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Table 3
Summary of Findings Comparing Market and Monopoly Schooling, by Result and
Outcome Category
Total Ach Eff Sat Ord Fac Ear Att
Significant Market Advantage 35 15 14 1 1 1 2 1
Statistically Insignificant 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Significant Government Advantage 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
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versal participation in a particular government
programbut ratheruniversal access to the edu-
cation marketplace; and second, that while
direct payment of tuition by parents is crucial,
even partial parental co-payments can have a
significant salutary effect. The first realization
means that it is unnecessary and indeed unde-
sirable to subsidize tuition for familieswhocan
already well afford it. Educationmarkets work
best when families pay directly for their own
children’s education, and so the ideal educa-
tion policy is one that makes it easier for par-
ents to assume that financial responsibility
themselves.
The secondrealizationcomes fromresearch
showing that there is a diminishing return to
the share of funding from parental fees.14
Schools become more efficient as the share of
funding that comes fromparents grows larger,
but the additional bang for each additional
buckdeclines asparents’ share of total funding
approaches 100 percent. In other words, the
expected improvement in school efficiency
when parental fees go from zero percent to 10
percentof total cost is larger thanwhenthe fees
rise from 90 to 100 percent. This means that
even low-income parents can enjoy a signifi-
cant improvement in school efficiency by
directly contributing amodest amount toward
their children’s education.
A policy for accomplishing this delicate bal-
ancing act of ensuring universal access to an
education marketplace that remains free and
vigorously competitive has already been pro-
posed by the Cato Institute: The Public Edu-
cation Tax Credit Act. This legislation derives
its name fromthe fact that it is designed to ful-
fill the goals and ideals of public education
through a combination of tax credits. In
essence,peoplewhopay for theeducationofan
eligible child, whether their own or someone
else’s, receive a dollar-for-dollar tax cut based
on the amount they spend (up to apre-set, per-
child maximum). Hence, families who pay for
their ownchildren’s education receive a tax cut,
and individual andbusiness taxpayerswhopay
for other children’s education (whether direct-
ly or through donations to nonprofit scholar-
ship funds) also see a dollar-for-dollar reduc-
tion in the taxes they owe. The total amount of
anycredits/scholarships forwhichagivenchild
is eligible depends on his or her parents’
income, ensuring that the program offers the
greatest benefit to thosewhoneed itmost. The
scholarships offered by nonprofit organiza-
tions and funded through tax-credited dona-
tions ensure that even the lowest-income fami-
lies can easily afford to choose between public
and private schools.
Sucha system,described indetail in apaper
by AdamSchaeffer, ensures universal access to
the education marketplace while impeding as
little as possible the conditions required for its
success.15
Conclusion
Across time, countries, and outcome mea-
sures, private provision of education outshines
public provision according to the overwhelm-
ing majority of econometric studies. Findings
of a statistically significant advantage for pri-
vate schooling outnumber findings of a signif-
icant advantage for public schooling by a ratio
of nearly 8 to 1, and the statistically significant
advantage for private schools outnumbers by a
ratio of 5 to 1 statistically insignificant find-
ings.
However, since the funding and regulatory
structuresof“public”and“private”schoolsvary
widely, this breakdown of the research is insuf-
ficiently detailed to be of real use to policymak-
ers. If we want to ascertain the merits of real
market reform in education, wemust compare
genuinely market-like private school systems
(whichareminimally regulatedandare funded,
at least in part, directly by parents) with state
school monopolies protected from significant
market competition (such as the typical U.S.
public school system). When we assess the evi-
dence using these more specific criteria, the
results aremore stark:There are 35 statistically sig-
nificant findings ofmarket-like education systems out-
performing government monopoly schooling, and
only twofindingsof thereverse, foraratioofmore than
17 to 1 in favor of free education markets. There is
but a single statistically insignificant finding
10
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among market versus monopoly comparisons,
and every finding comparing the efficiency of
market andmonopoly schooling is both statis-
tically significant and favorsmarkets.
These results discredit the notion, preva-
lent in both conservative and liberal political
circles, that the content of schoolingmust be
overseen by the state in order for schools to
achieve optimum performance. It is in fact
the least regulated market school systems
that show the greatest margin of superiority
over state schooling.
In order to better serve families, policymak-
ers should thus endeavor to provide universal
access to minimally regulated education mar-
kets in which parents, whenever possible,
directly pay at least some of the cost of their
children’s education. Education tax credit pro-
grams capable of accomplishing that objective
have alreadybeenproposedelsewhere, andpar-
tial, scaled-downversionsof suchprogramsare
already operating in several U.S. states.16
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